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Jurisdictional Donnybrook
DECIPHERING WETLANDS
JURISDICTION AFTER RAPANOS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, a multitude of appellate courts
have debated the precise boundaries of the Army Corps of
Engineers’ (“Corps”) jurisdiction to enforce the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”).1 This debate recently culminated with the Supreme
Court addressing the issue of the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction
for the third time in the CWA’s thirty-year history.2 In Rapanos
v. United States, a split decision and the subject of this Note,
the Supreme Court presented three tests for determining
wetlands jurisdiction under the CWA, but no test commanded a
majority of justices’ approval.3 This Note will argue that the
Rapanos court should have applied the agency deference
approach—upholding an agency’s construction of a statute so
long as the construction was reasonable4—to determine the
appropriateness of the Corps’ jurisdiction over the property at
issue. This Note will further argue that all courts addressing
the appropriateness of the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction should
implement this approach.

1
See United States v. Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 2004); In re
Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2003); Tracey v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP., 344
F.3d 407, 408 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598, 600 (7th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 699 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Krilich, 303 F.3d 784, 785 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., No. 014513, 2002 WL 1421411, at *1-2 (4th Cir. July 2, 2002); Rice v. Harken Exploration
Co., 250 F.3d 264, 264 (5th Cir. 2001); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243
F.3d 526, 527 (9th Cir. 2001).
2
See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2208 (2006); Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 159
(2001).
3
See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also id. at
2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the courts on remand should reinstate the
judgments if either the “significant nexus” or plurality test is met).
4
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984) (“[T]he question for the court is whether the agency’s [interpretation] is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
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The source of the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands is
the CWA. The CWA provides that the Corps may issue permits
for the discharge of pollutants or fill material into “navigable
waters,”5 and further defines “navigable waters” as “waters of
the United States.”6 While Congress left “waters of the United
States” undefined within the CWA, it evinced an intent that
jurisdiction under the CWA be “the broadest constitutional
interpretation.”7 In response, courts construed the definition of
“navigable waters” broadly to include waters that are not
actually navigable in the traditional sense.8 Under this logic,
the Corps issued a regulation defining “waters of the United
States” to include waters used in foreign or interstate
commerce; all interstate waters and wetlands; intrastate lakes,
rivers, and streams; tributaries;9 and wetlands adjacent to any
of these waters (“adjacent wetlands”).10 Unlike other features
5

The statute reads:

(a) Discharge into navigable waters at specified disposal sites.
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters at specified disposal sites. Not later than the fifteenth day after the
date an applicant submits all the information required to complete an
application for a permit under this subsection, the Secretary shall publish the
notice required by this subsection.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
6
“The term ‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
7
S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, at 3822.
8
See Int’l Paper Co. v. Oulette, 479 U.S. 481, 486 n.6 (1987).
9
The term “tributary” is left undefined by the Code of Federal Regulations
and the CWA, but is generally understood to mean “[a] stream flowing directly or
indirectly into [a body of water].” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1545 (8th ed. 2004).
10
33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006). For the purpose of this regulation,
(a) The term waters of the United States means
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes . . . ;
(4) All impoundments of water otherwise defined as waters of the United
States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this
section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of this section.
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mentioned in this regulation, wetlands are constantly changing
eco-systems, which may be wet for only part of the year.11
Therefore, some wetlands are difficult to designate as within
the Corps’ jurisdiction because these wetlands may not be
adjacent to another “water of the United States” for an entire
year.12
In Rapanos, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit’s decisions in two consolidated cases that had upheld
the Corps’ jurisdiction to deny permits to two parties wishing
to build on privately owned wetlands.13 The plurality decision
to remand the case produced three conflicting positions for
assessing the Corps’ right to regulate private wetlands and,
thus, the propriety of the Corps’ definition of “waters of the
United States.”14 First, in the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia
limited his interpretation of “waters of the United States” to
waters that are relatively permanent, standing, or flowing
bodies, and restricted adjacent wetlands covered by the CWA to
those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to “waters
of the United States.”15 Second, Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion proposed that a significant nexus must be satisfied
33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006).
11
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, What Are Wetlands?,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/vital/what.html [hereinafter What Are Wetlands?].
Wetlands are a vanishing element of the global ecological community yet the definition
of wetlands is so technical that reasonable minds differ on what it is they wish to
protect. One legal definition of wetlands requires soil covered by water for all or part of
the year. Wetlands, however, cannot be determined through a legal test, as these
features are eco-systems, which are more extensive than their component parts. Like
coral reefs and rainforests, wetlands support a variety of plant and animal life forms.
Both aquatic and terrestrial creatures live on wetlands depending upon whether the
region consists of coastal or inland wetlands. Id. Skeptics who refer to wetlands as
isolated, disease-ridden swamps overlook their value in contributing water
purification, water storage, flood prevention, erosion control, timber production,
recreation, and several other natural products to the surrounding environment and
human society. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Wetlands and People,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/vital/people.html.
Wetlands vary tremendously between coastal and inland regions. Coastal
regions often consist of a mix between salt and fresh water and are located on the
Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. What Are Wetlands?, supra. Many parts of these
regions are unvegetated because the salt water extinguishes the lives of the plants. On
the other hand, inland wetlands are almost entirely freshwater and are located near
moving bodies of water on floodplains. These wetlands frequently involve groundwater
or precipitation reaching the surface on a seasonal basis. In some cases, the ground
may be wet for only a few months per year. Id.
12
What Are Wetlands?, supra note 11.
13
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2235.
14
See id. at 2215, 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 2252 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
15
Id. at 2221, 2226.
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between the wetlands at issue and navigable-in-fact waters to
confer jurisdiction under the CWA, and provided several
factors for determining which wetlands had this nexus.16
Finally, Justice Stevens—joined by three dissenting justices—
advocated deference to the Corps’ jurisdiction, so long as its
interpretation of the CWA was reasonable.17 In response to
Rapanos, several courts have applied Kennedy’s significant
nexus test with reservation.18 A few courts have declared this
test too ambiguous, and have chosen instead to use their own
precedent on a case-by-case basis.19 As a result, the precise
boundaries of the Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA remain
unclear.20
This Note will argue that Justice Stevens’ agency
deference approach provides the correct standard for
examining the Corps’ jurisdiction under the CWA and that the
plurality and significant nexus tests advocated in Rapanos by
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, respectively, inappropriately
impose unnecessary judicial constraints on the Corps. While
the plurality test provides a plausible definition of the phrase
“waters of the United States,” this definition fails to recognize
the Corps’ administrative role in construing the statute, the
CWA’s thirty-year history of legislative and judicial precedent,
and the harmful effects that this definition would impose on
the environment through its practice. The significant nexus
test, in contrast, recognizes the importance of the CWA’s
thirty-year history and purpose of environmental protection,
but the concept of a “significant nexus” in practice would lead
to disparate outcomes and uncertainty for private property
16

Id. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “Navigable in fact” refers to waters
considered navigable in the traditional sense of capability for interstate commerce. The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). The factors suggested by Kennedy consisted of
“the statute’s goals and purposes. . . . [o ‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)).
17
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2252 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
18
United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2006); N. Cal. River
Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007), superseding 457
F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d 940, 943 (W.D. Ky.
2007); United States v. Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 1035078, at *14-15 (N.D.
Ind. Mar. 29, 2007); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 824
(N.D. Cal. 2007); United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629,
at *20-21 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006).
19
E.g., United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613
(N.D. Tex. 2006); see also United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25
(7th Cir. 2006) (discussing the limitations of applying Rapanos).
20
See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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owners and the government. Unlike these two previous tests,
the agency deference approach allows the Corps to further the
purposes and history of the CWA within its discretion and
provides for courts to intervene to enjoin an unreasonable
construction. In suggesting that the Rapanos Court reached an
improper result, this Note argues that agency deference should
be applied to the Corps’ jurisdiction over the property at issue
in that case, and, by extension, to all cases concerning the
Corps’ ability to regulate wetlands regardless of the presence or
absence of any surface connection to “waters of the United
States.”
Part II will describe the history behind the CWA and its
deference to the Corps on rule-making. Part III will then
demonstrate that the reasoning embodied in the plurality test
is not only flawed and strained, but also inconsistent with prior
Supreme Court precedent, CWA legislative history, and the
purposes of environmental protection behind the CWA. Next,
Part IV will contend that the significant nexus test
misinterprets relevant precedent and thwarts the interests of
both private property owners and the government. Finally,
Part V will argue that the agency deference position correctly
provides reasonable boundaries to the Corps’ jurisdiction
because the CWA’s structure, purpose, and thirty-year history
of jurisprudence—along with the strong policies of
administrative
efficiency,
economic
concerns,
and
environmental protection—trump the whims of individual
property owners.
II.

THE HISTORY BEHIND THE WETLANDS
JURISDICTION ISSUE

A.

The Clean Water Act

In 1972, Congress passed the CWA after a disastrous
pair of decades.21 Over the previous twenty years, Congress had
left water pollution regulation mostly to the states, and the
states had failed to adequately enforce any uniform policy
against interstate water pollution.22 This local experiment
21

S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1-2 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,

3672.
22
Id. The states actually had full power over enforcement until 1956, when
Congress authorized federal grants to be issued for pollution control and to help build
treatment plants. Id. This federal assistance through grants could not adequately
satisfy the needs of states, so Congress attempted to provide more federal support by
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resulted in several environmental disasters of the late 1960s
and early 1970s, which garnered national and congressional
attention.23 In response, Congress enacted the CWA.24 Through
the CWA, Congress sought to ameliorate concerns of future
disasters by attempting “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”25 As
the Supreme Court recognized, Congress saw the need for the
federal government to regulate water pollution because it
believed controlling the discharge of toxins into water at the
source would prevent them from traveling great distances
through the natural water system.26

creating a new federal agency in 1966 and adopting amendments in 1970 to add new
areas of federal liability. Id. at 1, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3669-70.
23
The most famous of these events was the Cuyahoga River catching fire due
to excessive pollution in 1969, discussed infra note 25. EPA, A BENEFITS ASSESSMENT
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAMS SINCE 1972, 1-2 (2000), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eermfile.nsf/Attachment+Names/EE-0429-01.pdf/$File/EE
-0429-01.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter BENEFITS ASSESSMENT]. In addition, a 1971
senate report noted that there was only one litigated case in the previous twenty years
under the abatement procedure of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. See S. REP.
NO. 92-414, at 5 (1971); as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672. In that case,
more than four years elapsed between the initial conference and the consent decree,
while more than five million tons of raw sewage was being dumped into a midwestern
city’s river each day. Id.
In 1970, the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution spent
fourteen days conducting public hearings on water pollution abatement and control.
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 3-4 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3670. These
hearings culminated in eighteen Senate bills on water pollution, four of which
recommended amendments to the current law on construction grants, standard setting,
and enforcement. The Subcommittee, however, was too busy in 1970 developing the
Clean Air Act, so the actual drafting of the CWA was postponed until the 95th
Congress could take up the issue. BENEFITS ASSESSMENT, supra, at 1-1, 1-2.
24
See What Are Wetlands?, supra note 11.
25
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). In addition, the CWA’s passage in 1972 evidenced a
broad purpose to reduce and eliminate pollution, create a new federal regime to
supplant the state administration system, and respond to several environmental
events garnering public attention. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens J., dissenting)
(citing BENEFITS ASSESSMENT, supra note 23). The EPA’s assessment discusses the
act’s provision regarding elimination of pollution discharges by 1985, and it cites the
improvements along the Cuyahoga River as benefits reversing the trend of
industrialization that led to the river catching fire in 1969. Id. at 1-1, 1-2.
26
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985)
(citing S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1-2 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3742) (“Water moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants
be controlled at the source.”). The hydrologic cycle, also known as the
water cycle, generally “describes the continuous movement of water on, above, and
below the surface of the Earth.” U.S. Geological Survey, The Water Cycle,
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/watercycle.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007). As this term
describes a literal cycle, it refers to water in all three of its states: liquid, vapor, and
ice. Id.
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The Army Corps of Engineers and the Clean Water Act

The Corps’ enforcement of the CWA profoundly reversed
a progressive loss of wetlands. At the time Congress enacted
the CWA, annual wetlands loss was about 500,000 acres per
year.27 Since that time, the annual wetlands loss has become a
slight annual gain in recent years.28 The Corps accomplished
this reversal through Section 404 of the CWA.29 The Section
404 program requires property owners to obtain a permit from
the Corps if they plan to carry out activities involving disposal
of dredged or fill materials into “waters of the United States.”30
While the EPA and other agencies31 play different roles in the
Section 404 program, the Corps is the sole administrative
agency with jurisdiction to issue permits.32 The Corps broadly
27
JEFFREY A. ZINN & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CRS REP. NO. RL33483,
WETLANDS: AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES, at 5 (June 20, 2006) (on file with author), updated
version available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crs/abstract.cfm?NLEid=1647 (July 26,
2007) [hereinafter ZINN & COPELAND I]. When European explorers landed in North
America in the seventeenth century, over 220 million acres of wetlands existed in the
lower forty-eight states. Id.; see also EPA, Wetlands: Status and Trends,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/vital/status.html. Three centuries later, less than
fifty percent of these lands remained. Id.
28
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) estimates this annual gain to
be about 32,000 acres per year between 1998 and 2004. ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note
27. Several environmentalists, however, dispute the gains in acreage as flawed data
representing the expansion and development of small private ponds, instead of natural
wetlands. Id. The FWS estimates 105.5 million acres remain in the forty-eight
contiguous states. Alaska currently encompasses an additional estimated 170-200
million acres of wetlands. EPA, Wetlands: Status and Trends, supra note 27. Louisiana
suffers 80% of the total loss of coastal wetlands in the United States and has recently
become a focus of potentially $14 billion in wetlands restoration legislation proposed
since the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. JEFFREY A. ZINN & CLAUDIA COPELAND,
CRS ISSUE BRIEF NO. IB97014, WETLAND ISSUES (Aug. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Wetlands/wet-5.cfm [hereinafter ZINN &
COPELAND II]. The Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, introduced by United States
Senator Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, would provide revenues from new oil and gas
production in the Gulf of Mexico in part to benefit coastal restoration along the
shorelines of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas. N.Y. Times Reverses Stand
on LA’s Sen. Mary Landrieu Oil Royalty Bill, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Oct. 30,
2006.
29
ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 27, at 6.
30
Id. “Waters of the United States” refers to the terms of 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7),
which defines “navigable waters” as “waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
The Corps’ authority to regulate dredging and filling derives from and relates back to
its jurisdiction to enforce the River and Harbors Act of 1899. ZINN & COPELAND I, supra
note 27, at 6. If a state’s governor wishes the state to implement its own permit
program in lieu of the Corps’, the governor must submit to the Administrator of the
EPA a description of the proposed state program. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1).
31
Most notably, the FWS, the Natural Resources Conservation Service, and
the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) also administer portions of Section
404. ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 27, at 6.
32
Id.
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defines this jurisdiction to include waters used in foreign or
interstate commerce; all interstate waters and wetlands;
intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams; tributaries;33 and
wetlands adjacent to any of these waters.34 Congress’
subsequent refusal to amend the CWA suggests its intent for
the Corps’ jurisdiction to remain broad.35
C.

The Congressional Acquiescence of 1977

In 1977, Congress considered amending the CWA
because critics of the Section 404 program had claimed that the
Corps overreached its authority to regulate wetlands not
“navigable-in-fact.”36 In the House, the Committee on Public
Works and Transportation reported a bill that limited the
Corps’ jurisdiction to navigable-in-fact waters.37 By contrast,
the Senate bill out of committee38 included only minor specific
exemptions from the Corps’ authority with no direct limit on
jurisdiction.39 Ultimately, after much debate, the Joint
Conference Committee acquiesced and allowed the broader

33
The term “tributaries” is left undefined by the regulations and the CWA,
but “tributaries” is generally understood to mean “a stream flowing into [a body of
water].” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1545 (8th ed. 2004).
34
33 C.F.R. § 328.3. For the relevant text, see supra note 10.
35
See discussion infra Part II.C.
36
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 135-36 (1985)
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-139, at 1-2 (1977)). Many of these critics were actually from
farm, forestry, and land development groups that pressured Congress to amend the
CWA so that they would not have to apply to the Corps for permits to develop certain
types of lands. See, e.g., United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 729, 729-30 (3d Cir. 1993);
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp. 278, 288 (W.D. La.
1981).
“Navigable-in-fact” refers to waters considered navigable in the traditional
sense of capability for interstate commerce. Once, the standard for wetlands
jurisdiction depended on whether a body of water was “navigable-in-fact.” The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (“Those rivers must be regarded as navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact.”) The Daniel Ball court further held that “navigable in
fact” waters were those capable of being used as “highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted.” Id. When the focus of environmental
regulation changed from promoting navigability to reducing pollutants, however, the
navigability requirement was dropped with the creation of the CWA. ZINN & COPELAND
I, supra note 27, at 6.
37
H.R. 3199, 95th Cong., at 80-81, 102-04 (1977) (cited in Riverside Bayview,
474 U.S. at 136).
38
The Senate committee reporting this legislation was the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136.
39
See generally S. 1952, 95th Cong., at 63-76 (1977) (cited in Riverside
Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136). In the Senate, the narrow House definition was defeated in
favor of the older definition. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136-37.
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construction of “navigable waters” to endure.40 Since this
acquiescence, Congress has not reconsidered limiting the
Corps’ jurisdiction.41
D.

The History of Agency Deference

If a party challenges the Corps’ jurisdiction, courts
traditionally use agency deference as the standard of review.
This standard derives from Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council.42 Under the agency deference approach, also
known as Chevron deference, a court must first ask if Congress
has expressed its intent on the issue.43 If Congress’ intent
is not clear, the court should not try to create its own
interpretation of the statute.44 Instead, the court must
determine whether the agency’s construction of the statute was
reasonable.45 Since Chevron, courts have utilized agency
deference to resolve countless issues relating to administrative
agencies’ jurisdiction.46 Thus, courts have typically used agency

40
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136-37. Senator Baker even remarked that
the CWA “retain[ed] the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation’s waters exercised
in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act.” Id. (citing 123 CONG. REC. 39209
(1977)); see also 123 CONG. REC. 38950-39210. The CWA is also known as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. Brian Knutsen, Asserting Clean Water Act Jurisdiction
Over Isolated Waters: What Happens After the SWANCC Decision, 10 ALB. L. ENVTL.
OUTLOOK 155, 157 (2005).
41
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(7) (2000); see also 33 C.F.R. 328.3 (2006).
42
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In
Chevron, the large oil company sought review of a D.C. Circuit decision that upheld a
Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) challenge to the EPA regulations of the
Clean Air Act. Id. at 844. In a 6-0 decision, the Supreme Court held the EPA
regulations should be upheld as a permissible construction of the Clean Air Act. Id. at
866.
43
“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43.
44
“If . . . the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.” Id.
at 843.
45
“Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” Id.
46
See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985); Train v. NRDC,
421 U.S. 60, 75, 87 (1975); Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. County Comm’rs of Carroll County,
Md., 268 F.3d 255, 267 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 729 (3d
Cir. 1993).
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deference as the standard to resolve issues regarding the
Corps’ and the EPA’s jurisdiction.47
E.

Pre-Rapanos Jurisprudence

Between the congressional acquiescence in 1977 and the
Rapanos decision, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
the Corps’ jurisdiction twice: in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes (“Riverside Bayview”)48 and in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers (“SWANCC”).49 In Riverside Bayview, the Corps
sought to enjoin the filling of property on what the Corps’ own
regulation defined as an “adjacent wetland.”50 The Sixth Circuit
narrowly construed the Corps’ jurisdiction over adjacent
wetlands to exclude “wetlands that were not subject to flooding
by adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to
support the growth of aquatic vegetation.”51 Reversing the
Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court used agency deference to hold
that the legislative history and environmental policy behind
the CWA commanded a broad interpretation of the Corps’
powers.52 The Riverside Bayview Court did not attempt to
47
“Accordingly, our review is limited to the question whether it is reasonable,
in light of the language, policies, and legislative history of the Act for the Corps to
exercise jurisdiction over [adjacent wetlands].” United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).

This view of the agency charged with administering the statute is entitled to
considerable deference; and to sustain it, we need not find that it is the only
permissible construction that EPA might have adopted but only that EPA’s
understanding of this very ‘complex statute’ is a sufficiently rational one to
preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of EPA.
Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125.
48
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 126.
49
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 176-77 (2001).
50
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124. The Corps’ regulation provided “[t]he
term ‘wetlands’ means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978). The Corps had sued a developer
in District Court to enjoin its construction of a housing development on wetlands,
which were inundated with ground water. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124, 130-31.
The District Court had granted the relief sought by the Corps, but the Sixth Circuit
reversed, and the Corps petitioned the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 125.
51
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 125. The Sixth Circuit’s holding that a
narrow construction must apply to the Corps’ authority under the CWA to avoid a
regulatory taking was quickly dismissed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 126-27.
52
Id. at 132-33.
Faced with such a problem of defining the bounds of its regulatory authority,
an agency may appropriately look to the legislative history and underlying
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construe the CWA or determine whether the Corps’ regulation
was the most beneficial means of enforcing the CWA’s
purposes.53 Instead, the Court recognized that the Corps’
definition of adjacent wetlands was reasonable, and held that
therefore it was improper to subject the issue to further judicial
scrutiny.54
In SWANCC, the Court denied the Corps’ wetlands
jurisdiction for the first time in the CWA’s history.55 The Corps
had enacted the Migratory Bird Rule,56 a regulation that
extended the Corps’ jurisdiction over “navigable waters” to
include all habitats of migratory birds in intrastate waters.57
When a state commission informed the Corps that a proposed
disposal site for solid waste was also the nesting site for 121
bird species, the Corps forbade any development on the site
claiming that a group of abandoned gravel mining depressions
constituted “waters of the United States.”58 In affirming the
Corps’ jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit noted the Corps’
authority under the CWA to regulate any waters within the
scope of the Commerce Clause and concluded that the site at

policies of its statutory grants of authority. Neither of these sources provides
unambiguous guidance for the Corps in this case, but together they do
support the reasonableness of the Corps’ approach . . . .
Id. at 132.
The Court went on to note that Congress recognized broad federal
authority in enacting the CWA and defining “waters of the United States.” Id. at 133.
Further, the Court mentioned the congressional concern for water quality, and noted
the weight of the Corps’ ecological judgment, as an expert agency in the field. Id. at
133-34. Finally, the Court discussed the 1977 congressional acquiescence and
amendment of the CWA to show that “Congress expressly stated that the term ‘waters’
included adjacent wetlands.” Id. at 136-39.
53
See id. at 138-39.
54
Id., 474 U.S. at 139 (“We are thus persuaded that the language, policies,
and history of the [CWA] compel a finding that the Corps has acted reasonably in
interpreting the Act . . . .” ).
55
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170-71.
56
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
57
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164-65.
58
Id. at 164. The Court noted:
[T]he Corps formally ‘determined that the seasonally ponded, abandoned
gravel mining depressions located on the project site, while not wetlands, did
qualify as “waters of the United States” . . . based upon the following criteria:
(1) the proposed site had been abandoned as a gravel mining operation; (2)
the water areas and spoil piles had developed a natural character; and (3) the
water areas are used as habitat by migratory bird [sic] which cross state
lines.’
Id. at 164-65.
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issue fell within these bounds.59 The Supreme Court reversed.60
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist held that the
gravel mining depressions at issue were not “navigable waters”
or adjacent wetlands, but failed to settle on one definition for
the critical link needed to classify wetlands as “waters of the
United States.”61 In response to the Corps’ argument for agency
deference, the SWANCC Court held that this approach was
inapplicable when an administrative interpretation reached
the limits of Congress’ power.62 Rehnquist also reasoned that
the 1977 congressional acquiescence63 did not apply to
“nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters” because this
acquiescence resulted from a concern for wetlands
preservation, not a concern for migratory birds, and occurred
nearly ten years before the Corps issued the Migratory Bird
Rule.64 Thus, the SWANCC Court held that the land at issue
was not subject to the Corps’ jurisdiction because of its isolated,
intrastate, and non-navigable nature.65
59

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166. The Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution states, “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. The
Supreme Court has held this clause gives Congress the expansive power to pass
legislation regulating any commerce that is “interstate” in nature. See Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Between 1937 and 1995, the Supreme Court failed
to declare any federal law unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’ scope under the
Commerce Clause. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 3.3, at 239 (2d ed. 2002). The Rehnquist Court, however, twice employed the
Commerce Clause to strike down two federal laws as unconstitutional. See United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun Free School Zones Act). Under Lopez and Morrison,
Congress may regulate (1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce,
and (3) activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Morrison, 529
U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
60
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
61
Id. Rehnquist described the requisite link in different parts of the opinion
as “wetlands ‘inseparably bound up with the “waters” of the Unites States,’” “wetlands
that actually abutted on a navigable waterway,” and wetlands possessing a “significant
nexus” with navigable-in-fact waters. Id. at 165-67.
62
“Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that
result.” Id. at 172.
63
This term refers to Congress’ failure to amend the Corps’ jurisdiction with
a proposed amendment in 1977. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 136-39 (1985); see also supra Part II.C.
64
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170-71.
65
Id. at 171-72. After SWANCC and before Rapanos, most appellate courts
limited SWANCC’s holding to waters that were isolated, intrastate, and non-navigable.
Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules for Agency Interpretation: Defining
Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 845, 866 (2004) (“Several
federal courts have now examined the impact of SWANCC on Clean Water Act
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The Rapanos Decision

The Rapanos Court issued the Supreme Court’s third
decision on the scope of the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction in the
CWA’s thirty-year history.66 The opinion consolidated the
appeals of two Sixth Circuit decisions, Rapanos v. United
States67 and Carabell v. United States,68 which involved
disputes between two property owners and the Corps over the
denial of permits to develop four plots of land.69 Each of the four
plots at issue contained wetlands and some connection to a
river or tributary of another body of water.70
Rapanos, a real estate developer, initiated construction
on wetlands at the various sites without applying to the Corps
for permits.71 Despite receiving several administrative
compliance orders from the EPA directing him to cease work
immediately, Rapanos continued to build on the sites and
performed extensive clearing and filling activities at these
locations.72 The United States brought criminal and civil
actions against Rapanos for illegally discharging fill material
into protected wetlands under the CWA, failing to respond to
requests for information, and ignoring the administrative
compliance orders.73 After a bench trial, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found that
Rapanos filled twenty-two acres of wetlands in violation of 33

jurisdiction. Most of these cases limit SWANCC’s effect to waters that are isolated,
intrastate, and non-navigable, although a few do not.”).
66
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208.
67
376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 2208.
68
391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208.
69
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2238-39 (Roberts, CJ., concurring). In Rapanos, four
pieces of land were at issue: (1) a plot of 230 acres, known as the Salzburg site,
including 28 acres of wetlands; (2) a plot of 275 acres, known as the Hines Road site,
including 64 acres of wetlands; (3) a plot of 200 acres, known as the Pine River site,
with 49 acres of wetlands; and (4) a parcel of 19.6 acres, the Carabell site, including
15.9 acres of wetlands. Id.
70
Id. at 2239. The District Court found that the Salzburg site had a surface
water connection to “tributaries of the Kawkawlin River which, in turn, flows into the
Saginaw River and ultimately into Lake Huron.” Id. The Hines Road site connected to
a drain that carried water into the Tittabawassee River, while the Pine River site’s
wetlands connected through surface water to the Pine River and also flowed into Lake
Huron. Id. In Carabell, the property was separated by a man-made berm from a ditch
that connected to a drain which empties into a creek that empties into Lake St. Clair.
Carabell v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
71
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2253. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 2239 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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U.S.C. §1311.74 Rapanos subsequently appealed to the Sixth
Circuit, which affirmed the findings of the District Court on the
grounds that Rapanos filled lands that contained “adjacent
waterways” to “navigable waters.”75
Unlike Rapanos, the Carabells apparently did not
attempt to develop their lands.76 The Carabells twice applied
for a permit to build condominium units on their land between
1993 and 1994.77 Upon the Corps’ second denial, the Carabells
brought an administrative appeal to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.78 The District Court
found that the Corps was within its jurisdiction to deny the
permit and was not arbitrary and capricious in doing so, and
the Sixth Circuit affirmed.79
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit on both
cases and remanded to the District Court.80 However, the Court
was divided on the proper test to be applied. Four justices
(Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts) agreed that “waters of the
United States” should be limited in application to “only
relatively permanent, standing, or flowing bodies of water” and
that only wetlands with a continuous surface connection to
“waters of the United States” may be classified as adjacent
wetlands.81 Four justices (Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and
Ginsburg) agreed that the Court should have deferred to the
Corps’ jurisdiction as an executive agency with a broad
congressional delegation of authority.82 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy argued that the case should be remanded on
the grounds that neither the plurality nor the dissent applied a

74
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This conclusion was
based largely on the “highly credible” testimony of Dr. Daniel Willard, an expert in
wetlands whom the District Court found to be “eminently qualified.” Rapanos, 376 F.3d
at 644 (“The district court found Dr. Willard to be ‘eminently qualified’ as an expert in
wetlands and concluded that his testimony was ‘highly credible.’”).
75
Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 639. The Court of Appeals pointed out that “adjacent
waterways” include any branch of a tributary system that eventually flows into a
navigable body of water. Id.
76
See Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917, 920-23
(E.D. Mich. 2003), aff’d, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d, Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at
2208.
77
Id. at 919.
78
Id. at 921.
79
Id. at 933-34; Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704, 710
(6th Cir. 2004).
80
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208.
81
Id. at 2221, 2226.
82
Id. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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significant nexus test.83 According to Kennedy, wetlands have a
“significant nexus” when they, alone or in combination with
nearby lands, “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity” of navigable-in-fact waters.84 Courts must
then assess the significant nexus in terms of the CWA’s goals
and purposes to determine whether the wetlands are “waters of
the United States.”85
G.

Cases Since Rapanos

Since Rapanos, courts have disagreed over the proper
test to apply.86 Some courts have chosen to apply the significant
nexus test as the narrowest grounds to follow Rapanos.87 Other
courts have held that the Corps has wetlands jurisdiction if the
wetlands at issue satisfy either the plurality or significant
nexus tests.88 Finally, a few courts have disregarded the
83

Id. at 2250 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2248.
85
Id.
86
See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir.
2006); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir.
2007), superseding 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d
56, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2006). United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605,
613 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
87
See S.F. Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 481 F.3d 700, 707-08 (9th Cir.
2007); N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000; Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 725;
United States v. Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Mar.
29, 2007); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 824 (N.D.
Cal. 2007). These courts follow the precedent of Marks v. United States, which states,
“[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
88
See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63-64; United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d
940, 944 (W.D. Ky. 2007); Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc’y v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F.
Supp. 2d 219, 226-27 (D. Conn. 2007); United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J
32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *18 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006). These courts follow a
suggestion from Justice Stevens’ dissent in Rapanos:
84

It has been our practice in a case coming to us from a lower federal court to
enter a judgment commanding that court to conduct any further proceedings
pursuant to a specific mandate. That prior practice has, on occasion, made it
necessary for Justices to join a judgment that did not conform to their own
views. In these cases, however, while both the plurality and Justice Kennedy
agree that there must be a remand for further proceedings, their respective
opinions define different test to be applied on remand. Given that all four
Justices who have joined this opinion would uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction in
both of these cases--and in all other cases in which either the plurality’s or
Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied--on remand each of the judgments should
be reinstated if either of those tests is met.
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plurality and significant nexus tests, choosing instead to apply
their own precedent.89 Thus, the extent of the Corps’ wetlands
jurisdiction remains unclear.90
III.

THE ILLOGIC OF THE PLURALITY TEST

The plurality test presents a flawed approach to
limiting the Corps’ jurisdiction for several reasons. First, the
plurality test threatens to defeat the purposes of the CWA by
excluding wetlands necessary to preserve water quality and
produce natural products.91 Second, this test presents an
implausible and self-contradicting construction of “waters of
the United States.”92 Third, the plurality test misconstrues
congressional intent and legislative history.93 Finally, the test
misreads prior Supreme Court precedent, and it fails to accord
agency deference.94 Most courts after Rapanos have disregarded
the plurality test.95 This Section will discuss the illogic of this
test and suggest that future courts also decline to accept the
Rapanos plurality’s constructions of “waters of the United
States” and adjacent wetlands.
A.

Environmental Effects of the Plurality Test

The environmental implications of adopting the
plurality test could be devastating. While natural wetlands
continue to disappear and the realm of private property

Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (footnotes omitted). But see King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771,
783 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[W]e do not think we are free to combine a dissent with a
concurrence to form a Marks majority.”). The King Court held that an opinion can only
be regarded as “narrower” when it is a subset of broader opinions. Id. at 781. The First
Circuit in Johnson, however, distinguished King because it noted that none of the tests
from Rapanos were a subset of another test. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64 (“[The King
Court’s] understanding of ‘narrowest grounds’ . . . does not translate easily to the
present situation. The cases in which Justice Kennedy would limit federal jurisdiction
are not a subsidy of the cases in which the plurality would limit jurisdiction.”).
89
See Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d 723 at 725; Chevron Pipe Line, 437 F.
Supp. 2d at 613.
90
Charles Lane, Justices Rein in Clean Water Act; Still-Divided Court Leaves
Reach of the Law Unclear, WASH. POST, June 20, 2006, at A1.
91
See infra Part III.A.
92
See infra Part III.B.
93
See infra Part III.C.
94
See infra Part III.D.
95
See infra Part III.E.
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expands,96 the Corps may be unable to regulate several types of
waters under this test. The plurality test forbids waters that
are not “relatively permanent, standing, or flowing bodies” and
wetlands lacking a “continuous surface connection” to “waters
of the United States” from ever being considered “waters of the
United States.”97 Waters falling outside the Corps’ jurisdiction
would thus include intermittent streams, seasonal rivers, and
periodically-dry river beds.98 Wetlands falling outside the
Corps’ jurisdiction would include wetlands near, but not
directly touching, a relatively permanent, standing, or flowing
body of water.99 These natural features would then become
unregulated candidates for development or the deposit of
dredge due to one of two arbitrary facts: (1) water was not
present for a sufficiently large number of days, or (2) the
wetland was close, but not directly touching, “water of the
United States.” Two polluters that cause the same amount of
damage to the environment might face disparate degrees of
liability based solely on a percentage of days or the proximity of
a connection.100 Developers, polluters, and property owners
would be encouraged to alter the nature of their property in
order to exempt their lands from the Corps’ jurisdiction.101
Plant and animal life forms that rely on intermittent bodies of
water and non-continuous wetlands for subsistence would be
forced to find other habitats or die off in the face of
development.102 In essence, eco-systems would die.103 While
96
ZINN & COPELAND II, supra note 28. A FWS study estimated an annual
loss of wetlands in the continental United States of 58,000 acres per year between 1986
and 1997. Id.
97
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2221, 2224.
98
See id. at 2259-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99
Id. at 2262.
100
In his dissent, Justice Stevens discusses a hypothetical stream that flows
for 290 days of the year and another stream that flows for the entire year to illustrate
that polluters in both streams could cause the same effect on downstream waters,
while realizing disparate levels of liability under the plurality test. Id. (“Under the
plurality’s view, then, the Corps can regulate polluters who dump dredge into a stream
that flows year round but may not be able to regulate polluters who dump into a
neighboring stream that flows for only 290 days of the year—even if the dredge in this
second stream would have the same effect on downstream waters as the dredge in the
year-round one.”).
101
For example, a developer could block the inundation of water onto his
property in order to prevent it from including a relatively permanent, standing, or
flowing body of water. This step would remove the Corps’ jurisdiction over the property,
and thus allow the property owner to proceed with development.
102
What Are Wetlands?, supra note 11. Both aquatic and terrestrial creatures
live on wetlands, and some species’ habitat depends upon whether the area consists of
coastal or inland wetlands. Id. “Destruction of wetlands eliminates or severely
minimizes their function and value. Drainage of wetlands prevents surface water
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developers may argue the necessity of sacrifices to prevent the
Corps from overreaching its authority, statistics indicate the
Corps’ permit process is far from highly selective.104 In reality,
the Corps denies less than 1% of fill permits.105 Finally, as
Justice Stevens points out, the large investments necessary for
such development show that the property owners affected by
the Section 404 program106 are quite capable of lobbying their
representatives for a change in congressional policy.107 The
effects of the plurality test would work cruel and unnecessary
destruction on the environment in the name of needlessly
Therefore,
the
promoting
economic
development.108
environmental consequences of the plurality test suggest that a
harsh standard for establishing the Corps’ jurisdiction would
be inappropriate.
B.

The Plurality Test as a Matter of Statutory Construction

The plurality test, as a matter of statutory construction,
suffers from inconsistency and implausibility. The first holding
of the plurality’s opinion—that “only relatively permanent,
standing or flowing bodies of water” make up “waters of the
United States”109—results from a thorough tour of the Webster’s
New International Dictionary (“Webster’s Second”), which
Scalia separately cites to define such ambiguous terms as “the,”
“waters,” and “waters of the United States.”110 Somehow, Scalia
storage and reduces their water quality enhancement function. Wetland filling does
likewise as well as destroying vital habitats for native fish and wildlife species.” NWI
Values of Wetlands for Flood and Storm Surge Attenuation, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service, http://www.fws.gov/nwi/stormvalues.htm.
103
What Are Wetlands?, supra note 11; see also U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
National Wetlands Inventory: Developing and Providing Wetlands Information,
http://www.fws.gov/fisheries/CD/Programs/National_Wetlands_Inventory.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 13, 2007) (noting the ecological and economic importance of preserving
wetlands as eco-systems). For further information on eco-systems, see discussion supra
note 11.
104
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATERS AND WETLANDS: CORPS OF
ENGINEERS NEEDS TO EVALUATE ITS DISTRICT OFFICE PRACTICES IN DETERMINING
JURISDICTION 8 (GAO-04-297, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04297.pdf.
105
In 2002, for example, the Corps denied 128 Section 404 permits out of
85,445 applications. Id.
106
The Section 404 program is the process employed by the Corps to issue
permits under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 27,
at 2.
107
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2259 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108
See id.
109
Id. at 2221 (plurality opinion).
110
Id. at 2220.
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concludes that the use of the definite article “the” and the
plural version of “waters” links the terms of 33 U.S.C. § 1311
with the definitions in Webster’s Second, which refer to water
“[a]s found in streams and bodies forming geographical
features such as oceans, rivers, and lakes” or “the flowing or
moving masses, as of waves or flood, making up such streams
or bodies.”111 Next, Justice Scalia takes the awkward step of
equating the preceding definitions with his own requirement of
“relatively permanent, standing, or flowing” water without

111

Id. Justice Scalia continued:

The Corps’ expansive approach might be arguable if the CSA [sic] defined
‘navigable waters’ as ‘water of the United States.’ But ‘the waters of the
United States’ is something else. The use of the definite article (‘the’) and the
plural number (‘waters’) show plainly that § 1362(7) does not refer to water in
general. In this form, ‘the waters’ refers more narrowly to water ‘[a]s found in
streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers,
[and] lakes,’ or ‘the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making
up such streams or bodies.’
Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter
Webster’s Second]). Scalia’s distinction between “waters” and “water” would therefore
remove the Corps’ jurisdiction from several types of natural features based on the
presence of a single letter, when Congress’ express purposes and legislative history
counsel for the opposite conclusion.
Further, Scalia supplies no reason for citing the Webster’s Second beyond
his conclusion that it provides “the only natural definition of the term ‘waters.’” Id. at
2220. Judging by his abandonment of Webster’s Second when he defines “adjacent
wetlands,” Scalia must have chosen this source because it was most advantageous to
support a conclusion he had already reached. Thus, the definitions of ‘waters’ cited by
Scalia within Webster’s Second do not connote the significance of a controlling rule of
law.
Finally, Webster’s Second’s definitions of “waters” provide inadequate
support for Scalia’s conclusion. Even if “waters” refers to ‘[a]s found in streams and
bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes” or “the flowing
or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bodies,” these
definitions do not mandate that waters be permanent, standing, or flowing bodies. Id.
at 2220 (citing Webster’s Second). At most, these definitions connote that some waters
have these qualities, but others may lack these qualities. Therefore, the plurality test’s
first conclusion lacks support in the cited definitions.
One can only guess why Scalia attempts this strained construction of
“waters,” and why the other three members of the plurality subscribe to it, when these
Justices could have adopted the more obvious position: Congress intended to give the
Corps broad discretion to define the Corps’ jurisdiction. A potential explanation can be
given by a quote from Chief Justice Roberts’s brief concurring opinion: “[After
SWANCC], the Corps chose to adhere to its essentially boundless view of the scope of
its power.” Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Roberts use of the words “essentially
boundless” indicates an ideological belief, possibly held by other members of the
plurality, that the Corps’ jurisdiction is too large, and must be reduced at all costs. If
this belief is the real motivation behind the plurality’s “revisionist reading” of the
CWA, the Court’s agency jurisprudence has taken a shameful turn beyond impartiality
into ideology, and the Court is lucky this view does not command majority approval. Id.
at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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defining any of these terms.112 Although Scalia points out that
“[n]one of these terms encompasses transitory puddles or
ephemeral flows of water,” the conclusion that all “waters of
the United States” therefore must be relatively permanent
lacks a logical basis.113 As Justice Stevens points out in his
dissent, Webster’s Second says nothing about whether waters
can be intermittent or ephemeral and yet be classified as
“waters.”114 Therefore, the plurality test’s first element lacks
foundation.
In the second part of the plurality test—that “adjacent
wetlands” must have a “continuous surface connection” to
“waters of the United States”—Justice Scalia abandons the
counsel of his “preferred” source, Webster’s Second, to read in
an “amendment” to the CWA.115 Delving immediately into the
case history of Riverside Bayview and SWANCC for foundation,
Scalia fails to conduct any investigation on a linguistic
meaning of “adjacent,” “wetlands,” or “adjacent wetlands.”116
One potential reason for this omission might be the definition
of “adjacent” in Webster’s Second, which defines “adjacent” as
“nearby” or “close,” and explicitly states “[o]bjects are adjacent
when they lie close to each other, but not necessarily in actual
contact.”117 This definition squarely conflicts with any
requirement of a connection. Under the Corps’ definition,
“adjacent” means “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring,” and
“adjacent wetlands” include non-contiguous wetlands.118 This
112

Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220-21 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2221.
114
Id. at 2260 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115
Id. at 2226 (plurality opinion), construed in id. at 2262 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). By “amendment,” Stevens is referring to Scalia’s logic formulating the
plurality test. In creating this test, Scalia devised a definition for two terms in the
CWA. Thus, Scalia amended the CWA by promulgating these two definitions. See id.
Stevens also notes that the two canonical principles that the plurality test relies
upon—concern over intrusion on state power and constitutional avoidance—are
inapplicable to the issue of adjacent wetlands. Id. at 2261. On the state power intrusion
issue, “Congress found it ‘essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the
source,’ and the Corps can define ‘waters’ broadly to accomplish this aim;” and on the
constitutional avoidance issue, “[t]he wetlands in these cases are not ‘isolated’ but
instead are adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and play important
roles in the watershed . . . .” Id. at 2261-62.
116
Id. at 2225-27 (plurality opinion).
117
Webster’s Second defines adjacent as “[l]ying near, close, or contiguous;
neighboring; bordering on.” See id. at 2263 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Webster’s
Second 32).
118
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2006) (“Wetlands separated from other waters of the
United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and
the like are ‘adjacent wetlands.’”).
113
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definition is both consistent with the delegation of authority in
the CWA and other legal and nonlegal definitions of
“adjacent.”119 Therefore, the plurality test’s requirement of a
“continuous surface connection” implausibly fails to consider
accepted definitions of “adjacent” and conflicts with the
methods of construction used to construe “waters of the United
States.”
C.

The Plurality Test Versus Congressional Intent and
Legislative History

The plurality test fails most, perhaps, in its attempt to
reflect consistency with congressional intent. Congress made
no mention of permanence, connections, or Webster’s Second
when it promulgated § 1311 in 1972.120 At the time, Congress’
intent was to eliminate pollution and resolve the problems
caused by the states’ failure to regulate their own programs.121
The CWA, as a result, gave broad power to the federal
government, allowing the Corps to define “waters of the United
States.”122 In contrast, the plurality test’s interpretations of
“waters of the United States” and “adjacent wetlands” would
limit federal power and frustrate this intent.123 Moreover, the
plurality test conflicts with Congress’ 1977 acquiescence.124
While Scalia “ha[s] no idea whether the Members’ failure to act
in 1977 was attributable to their belief that the Corps’

119
See, e.g., Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2262 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Webster’s Second 32); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 44 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “adjacent”
as “[l]ying near or close to, but not necessarily touching”).
120
See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000)).
121
S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1-2 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3675-76.
122
See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, § 404, 86 Stat. 816, 884 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000)).
123
By specifying that “waters of the United States” must be “relatively
permanent, standing, or flowing” bodies and holding that adjacent wetlands must
include a “continuous surface connection,” the plurality test specifically removes
certain wetlands from the jurisdiction of the federal government. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct.
at 2221, 2226. Ironically, this removal occurs against the explicit wishes of most state
governments, as 33 states petitioned the Rapanos Court in support of the Sixth
Circuit’s decision. Id. at 2224 n.8.
124
In 1977, Congress decided not to amend the CWA to reduce the Corps’
jurisdiction. H.R. REP. No. 95-139, at 54 (1977). By removing specific wetlands and
waters from the Corps’ jurisdiction, the plurality test also works in contravention of the
congressional intent, which this acquiescence conveys. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra Part II.C.
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regulations were correct,”125 the congressional record indicates
that the Corps’ jurisdiction was specifically debated and
resolved in favor of an expansive definition.126 Therefore, the
plurality test conflicts with both the legislative intent at the
drafting and through the subsequent history of the CWA.
D.

The Plurality Test’s Treatment of Prior Supreme
Court Precedent

Similarly, the plurality test fails to properly interpret
the prior case law on the Corps’ jurisdiction. Under Chevron,
when congressional intent is ambiguous, courts must defer to
an agency’s construction of a statute so long as the construction
is reasonable.127 In Riverside Bayview, the Court applied agency
deference to uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction over adjacent
wetlands.128 The SWANCC Court, in contrast, denied the Corps
agency deference because the intrastate, isolated nature of the
land at issue “invoke[d] the outer limits of Congress’ power”
under the Commerce Clause.129 The wetlands at issue in
Rapanos, however, significantly differed from the gravel pit in
SWANCC because the Rapanos wetlands held connections to
various bodies of water, which directly affected interstate
commerce.130 Therefore, upholding the Corps’ jurisdiction in
125

Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2230.
123 CONG. REC. 39,209 (1977) (“[T]he conference bill retains the
comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation’s waters . . . .”). Specifically, the record
shows that the 1977 House passed a bill limiting the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction to
navigable-in-fact waters and their adjacent wetlands. See H.R. 3199, 95th Cong., at 8081, 102-04 (1977). Next, the Senate passed a bill that contained no redefinition. S.
1952, 95th Cong., at 63-76 (1977). Finally, the record shows the Conference Committee
of both houses adopted the Senate’s approach. 123 CONG. REC. 39,209 (1977) (“The
solution presented in the Senate Bill was adopted with only minor changes.”).
127
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
128
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 138 (1985).
129
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001). The Commerce Clause, in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, expressly gives Congress “power . . . [t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. The SWANCC Court held, “[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute
invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress
intended that result.” SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172. This court went on to explain that its
requirement was derived from “[its] prudential desire not to needlessly reach
constitutional issues and our assumption that Congress does not casually authorize
administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional
authority.” Id. at 172-73.
130
See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2239. The District Court found that the
Salzburg site had a surface water connection to “tributaries of the Kawkawlin River
which, in turn, flows into the Saginaw River and ultimately into Lake Huron.” The
Hines Road site connected to a drain that carried water into the Tittabawassee River,
126
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Rapanos would not have raised the “significant constitutional
questions”131 cited in SWANCC, and the Rapanos plurality
should not have abrogated agency deference.
1. The Plurality’s Misapplication of SWANCC
Instead of recognizing the lack of “constitutional
questions” in Rapanos, Scalia relied heavily on SWANCC to
redefine “adjacent wetlands” under an inappropriate standard.
In Scalia’s opinion, though disputed by several other courts,
SWANCC held that adjacent wetlands directly abut “waters of
the United States.”132 SWANCC, however, denied the Corps
jurisdiction under a “heightened concern” evoked by
“constitutional questions” relating to the isolated, intrastate
lands at issue in that case.133 In contrast, the plurality in
Rapanos did not consider any “constitutional questions”
because the Rapanos wetlands were not isolated.134 The
Rapanos plurality did, however, apply the same heightened
concern of SWANCC to impose that Court’s construction of
adjacent wetlands upon the Corps.135 As the SWANCC standard

while the Pine River site’s wetlands connected through surface water to the Pine River
and also flowed into Lake Huron. Id. at 2239. In Carabell, the property was separated
by a man-made berm from a ditch that connected to a drain, which empties into a creek
that empties into Lake St. Clair. Carabell v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923
(E.D. Mich. 2003).
131
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
132
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2218. Most appellate courts have limited the
holding of SWANCC to the intrastate, isolated land at issue in that case. Verchick,
supra note 65. Further, while mentioning “wetlands that actually abutted on a
navigable waterway” as one of three definitions for adjacent wetlands, the SWANCC
court never required direct abutment as a condition precedent for adjacency. SWANCC,
531 U.S. at 167.
133
SWANCC concerned pools created in abandoned sand and gravel pits
where migratory birds nest. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. These pits, unlike the waters
at issue in Rapanos, were wholly intrastate. See id. Thus, the land at issue in
SWANCC evoked the outer limits of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause,
causing the court to evaluate the Corps’ jurisdiction under a “heightened concern.” Id.;
see also John D. Ostergren, SWANCC in Duck Country: Will Court-Ordered Devolution
Fill the Prairie Potholes?, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 396-99 (2003) (discussing the effect
of SWANCC on federal jurisdiction over intrastate, non-navigable isolated wetlands).
For a discussion on the scope of the Commerce Clause, see discussion supra note 59.
134
See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225.
135
Specifically, the court held that the Corps’ definition of “waters of the
United States” was impermissible, under Chevron, and applied the direct abutment
requirement of SWANCC, instead of deferring to the Corps. Id. The court’s conclusion
that the definition was impermissible, however, is largely founded upon the court’s
reading of Webster’s Second for the requirement of “relatively permanent, standing, or
flowing bodies of water” and SWANCC for the requirement of a “direct surface
connection.” Id. at 2221, 2224-25. Thus, the court renders an agency’s construction of a
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was intended to address constitutionally invasive exercises of
federal power and not all of the exercises of the Corps’
wetlands jurisdiction, the plurality’s use of SWANCC was
improper.
2. The Plurality’s Erroneous Distinction of
Riverside Bayview
In addition, the plurality erroneously distinguished
Riverside Bayview. Riverside Bayview supported deferring to
the Corps as long as its jurisdiction was reasonable and
provided the controlling precedent on the central issue in
Rapanos—adjacent wetlands.136 Arguing to the contrary,
Justice Scalia held that Riverside Bayview was irrelevant
because “the definition of tributaries was not at issue in that
case.”137 Scalia’s logic, however, is misplaced. While tributaries
were not at issue in Riverside Bayview, this fact is de minimus
because this precedent was intended to apply to all wetlands,
including those with a tributary connection to “waters of the
United States.”138 In Rapanos, tributaries connected the
wetlands at issue to “waters of the United States.”139 Therefore,
Riverside Bayview provided the controlling precedent, and the
plurality improperly distinguished this case. 140
E.

Post-Rapanos Courts Have Disregarded the
Plurality Test

Several lower courts have entirely snubbed the strict
nature of the plurality test.141 These cases have either followed
statute “impermissible” based on the weight of a dictionary and an irrelevant
precedent. Id. at 2224.
136
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985).
137
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2229.
138
Id. at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139
Id. at 2256-57.
140
Essentially, the test renders the determinations of Riverside Bayview and
SWANCC insignificant by creating an entirely new standard that conflicts with the
underlying premises of these cases.
141
N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding that the “significant nexus” test “provides the controlling rule of
law”); United States v. Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d 940, 944 (W.D. Ky. 2007); United
States v. Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2007);
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 824 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(holding that satisfaction of the plurality test is “not necessary” for jurisdiction under
the CWA); United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *19
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006) (allowing the jurisdictional requirement to be met if either the
plurality or “significant nexus” test was satisfied). An EPA administrative decision also
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Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test142 as the controlling
rule of law or awarded jurisdiction to the Corps if the property
at issue met either the plurality or significant nexus tests’
criteria.143 As these decisions concerned the Corps’ wetlands
jurisdiction, the unwillingness of these courts to apply the
plurality test indicates the impracticality of categorically
applying this standard.
In conclusion, the plurality test consists of two arbitrary
definitions,144 both of which lack consistency and foundation.
These constructions fail to comport with congressional intent,
subsequent legislative intent, both of the prior Supreme Court
cases involving the subject matter at issue, and the
environmental concerns expressed in thirty-three amici briefs,
none of which advocated the plurality’s test.145 In addition, the
test sharply contradicts the proper deference owed to the Corps
under Chevron and Riverside Bayview.146 Moreover, the test
would
yield
unnecessary
and
harsh
environmental
consequences, such as the arbitrary destruction of eco-systems
and the death of plant and animal life.147 For these reasons and
others, lower courts since Rapanos facing similar issues have
recognized that the plurality test was “at odds with the [CWA’s] concern with
downstream water quality.” In re J. Phillips Adams, No. CWA-10-2004-0156, 2006 EPA
ALJ LEXIS 33, *71 (EPA Oct. 18, 2006). This tribunal employed Justice Kennedy’s
significant nexus test to uphold CWA jurisdiction over the property at issue. Id.
142
See discussion infra Part IV.
143
N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000; Cundiff, 480 F. Supp. 2d at
944; Fabian, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15; Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 824;
Evans, 2006 WL 2221629, at *19.
144
The first part of the plurality test states “‘waters of the United States’
include only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water.” Rapanos, 126
S. Ct. at 2221. The second part of the plurality test states “the phrase ‘the waters of the
United States’ includes only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously
flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary
parlance as ‘streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’” Id. at 2225 (citing Webster’s
Second, at 2882).
145
Id. at 2224 n.8; id. at 2259 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting (“[T]he Corps’
approach has the overwhelming endorsement of numerous amici curiae, including 33
States . . . .”). An amicus curiae is an entity “who is not a party to a lawsuit but who
petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action because that
person has a strong interest in the subject matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (8th
ed. 2004).
146
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39
(1985). The Riverside Bayview Court held the Corps’ construction of the CWA
interpreting “waters of the United States” to include adjacent wetlands was
reasonable, and therefore permissible under Chevron. Id.
147
As discussed above, the arbitrary nature of the plurality test’s two
requirements would categorically exclude certain wetlands, and force plants and
animals depending on these lands to either die off or relocate. See discussion supra
Part III.A. Further, this result is unnecessarily harsh because the Corps only denies
1% of permits. Id.
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sidestepped or avoided the plurality test.148 This Note argues
that courts should continue to disregard the plurality test as an
implausible, inconsistent standard, which fails to accord
appropriate deference to legislative intent, prior case law, the
views of state governments, or the Corps’ judgment.
IV.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST

The significant nexus test, already the most frequently
applied standard of the Corps’ jurisdiction in the post-Rapanos
era,149 is likely to be the most influential test deriving from
Rapanos. This test requires that property exhibit a “significant
nexus” between the wetlands at issue and navigable-in-fact
waters for the Corps to have jurisdiction.150 This nexus is
“assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and purposes,” as
outlined in 33 U.S.C. § 1251.151 For the nexus to exist, either
the wetlands or a combination of the wetlands and surrounding
lands must “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity” of navigable-in-fact waters.152 Justice
Kennedy further notes that wetlands whose effects on water
quality are “speculative” or “insubstantial” fall outside the
Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction.153 On its face, the significant
nexus test may seem reasonable through its balancing of
interests and respect for both congressional intent and prior
case law. This test, however, is far from the most logical or
148
E.g., N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000; United States v. Johnson,
467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006) (suggesting that on remand the district court could base
jurisdiction on either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s standard); Fabian, 2007 WL
1035078, at *15; Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 824; Evans, 2006 WL
2221629, at *19; United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir.
2006); United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex.
2006).
149
Since Rapanos, two courts have disregarded the Rapanos decision. See
Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 725; Chevron Pipe Line, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 613. Other
courts addressing this issue have either applied the “significant nexus” test, as the
narrowest grounds of the Rapanos holding, or allowed the Corps jurisdiction if the
wetlands at issue met either the plurality or “significant nexus” test. See Fabian, 2007
WL 1035078, at *15; Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 824; Evans, 2006 WL
2221629, at *19; N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000; Johnson, 467 F.3d at 6364.
150
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Consistent with
SWANCC and Riverside Bayview and with the need to give the term ‘navigable’ some
meaning, the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a
significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the
traditional sense.”).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
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proper one due to its incredible ambiguity and the
complications it creates for both government enforcement and
private property owners in the permit process.
A.

The History of the Significant Nexus Test

The significant nexus test originated in Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion in SWANCC.154 The Riverside Bayview
Court failed to mention the term “significant nexus” and
concluded that the Corps’ jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands
was reasonable under agency deference.155 In SWANCC,
however, Justice Rehnquist noted that “[i]t was the significant
nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that
informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview.”156 This
“significant nexus” was one of three potential definitions of the
requisite link suggested by the SWANCC Court, which never
decided upon one definition.157 Therefore, as read by SWANCC,
the significant nexus of the property at issue in Riverside
Bayview was a factor permitting that Court to hold that agency
deference was appropriate.158 In contrast, the Court in
SWANCC held that the property at issue lacked this nexus, but
the Court’s holding did not turn on this determination.159
Instead, the Court concluded that an expanded definition of
“navigable waters” to include isolated ponds would rob the
term “navigable” of any effect.160 Rehnquist also concluded that
the constitutional questions generated by the property’s
isolated, intrastate nature required a clear intent from
154

SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001).
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
The Riverside Bayview Court recognized that agency deference, under Chevron, was
the appropriate standard for evaluating the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction. Id.
156
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
157
Rehnquist described the requisite link in different parts of the opinion as
“wetlands ‘inseparably bound up with the “waters” of the Unites States,’” “wetlands
that actually abutted on a navigable waterway,” and wetlands possessing a “significant
nexus” with navigable-in-fact waters. Id. at 165-67; see also Verchick, supra note 65, at
865 (“In distinguishing Riverside [Bayview from] its current case, the SWANCC
majority described ‘adjacent’ waters in various ways . . . . But however one defined the
critical link to navigable waters, the Court was sure it was absent from those Illinois
gravel pits.”).
158
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
159
Id. The Court’s determination, in fact, turned on the effect of the Migratory
Bird Rule on “navigable waters” and the constitutional questions raised by the isolated,
intrastate nature of the property at issue. Id. at 171-72.
160
Id. at 172 (“We cannot agree that Congress’ separate definitional use of the
phrase ‘waters of the United States’ constitutes a basis for reading the term ‘navigable
waters’ out of the statute.”).
155
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Congress to uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction.161 Thus, the
SWANCC holding rested on an unwillingness to misconstrue
“navigable” and a belief that the property at issue in that case
was invoking the outer limits of Congress’ power.
Justice Kennedy created the significant nexus test out
of a factor from SWANCC’s reading of Riverside Bayview.162
These cases, however, relied on other factors to reach their
conclusions. While Riverside Bayview rested on agency
deference, SWANCC denied the Corps’ jurisdiction based on
congressional intent and constitutional implications.163 In the
following subsections, this Note will suggest the impropriety of
the significant nexus test, due to its failures as a matter of
congressional intent, ambiguity, and economic efficiency.
B.

The Significant Nexus Test Versus Congressional
Intent and Legislative History

The significant nexus test addresses the congressional
intent examined in SWANCC and Riverside Bayview by
requiring courts to assess the nexus in terms of the statute’s
goals and purposes.164 Three questions, however, arise over
whether this assessment is actually a furtherance of Congress’
intent. First, the test’s consideration of the CWA’s initial “goals
and purposes” leaves no room for consideration of subsequent
legislative history.165 Second, the test defeats Congress’ intent
to provide broad federal regulatory authority because the test
requires a “significant nexus” as a condition precedent to any

161
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (“Where an administrative interpretation of a
statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that
Congress intended that result.”).
162
Justice Kennedy introduces the concept of a “significant nexus,” without
any context beyond stating its “[c]onsisten[cy] with SWANCC and Riverside Bayview
and with the need to give the term ‘navigable’ some meaning.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at
2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The SWANCC Court’s reading of the Riverside Bayview
opinion, however, was flawed, because Riverside Bayview upheld the Corps’ jurisdiction
based on agency deference, and never mentioned the term “significant nexus.” United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1985). Therefore, the
“significant nexus” in Riverside Bayview was, at most, only a factor in that Court’s
holding.
163
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72; see also Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
164
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The required nexus
must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and purposes.”).
165
Id. Kennedy’s annunciation of the significant nexus test mentions that
courts should consider the CWA’s goals and purposes, but does not mention whether
the 1977 congressional acquiescence should be considered. Id.
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consideration of congressional intent.166 Finally, the test
misleads courts into disregarding the part of the test calling for
an assessment of congressional intent.167
Although the significant nexus test recognizes
congressional intent, this test abandons consideration of the
CWA’s legislative history. In CWA jurisprudence, the CWA’s
legislative history is just as important as the initial goals and
purposes of Congress.168 While Congress thoroughly considered
the CWA before its enactment in 1972, the congressional
acquiescence to the Corps’ jurisdiction in 1977 provided
perhaps a more focused analysis on wetlands preservation.169
Both houses debated proposals for a more limited Section 404
jurisdiction,170 and the House passed a bill limiting the Corps’
jurisdiction, but the old definition was ultimately retained.171
Without considering these deliberations, courts may ignore
specific evidence of express congressional intent acknowledging
the validity of the Corps’ interpretation of its jurisdiction.172
Therefore, the absence of consideration for legislative history in
the significant nexus test detracts from a court’s ability to
166

Id. (“The required nexus must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals
and purposes.”).
167
Though courts have implicitly followed congressional intent since Rapanos,
the omission of any discussion of congressional intent within these decisions could
prove troublesome. This omission would be troublesome because it might cause future
courts to disregard the assessment of congressional intent, even though the significant
nexus test explicitly calls for an assessment of this intent. See N. Cal. River Watch v.
City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson,
467 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL
1035078, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2007); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co.,
469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 824 (N.D. Cal. 2007); United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J
32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *21-22 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006).
168
Congress’ intent through its 1977 acquiescence to the broader definition of
the Corps’ jurisdiction should be just as important to a court’s analysis as Congress’
original intent behind the act. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 137-38 (discussing
the importance of the congressional acquiescence to the Corps).
169
See id. at 136-37 (discussing the congressional acquiescence after
arguments were made for and against a narrower interpretation of jurisdiction).
170
Section 404 jurisdiction refers to the Corps’ jurisdiction to issue or deny
permits to deposit dredge or fill material on “waters of the United States.” ZINN &
COPELAND I, supra note 27, at 6.
171
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 137. The House bill would have narrowed
the Corps’ jurisdiction to govern only wetlands that were navigable-in-fact. See H.R.
3199, 95th Cong., at 80-81, 102-04 (1977). The Joint Conference Committee, however,
retained the broad definition of jurisdiction, allowing the Corps to continue
interpreting the CWA’s language—“waters of the United States.” See S. 1952, 95th
Cong., at 63-76 (1977).
172
The 1977 congressional acquiescence to the Corps’ jurisdiction presents the
only moment in CWA history when Congress has acknowledged with approval the
Corps’ past interpretations of its jurisdiction. United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719,
729 (3d Cir. 1993); Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 137-38.
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analyze all the factors that may have contributed to Congress’
intent behind the CWA.
The significant nexus test raises a second congressional
intent issue concerning the worth of this intent when a
significant nexus is a condition precedent.173 By requiring a
significant nexus before any analysis of legislative intent, this
test immediately imposes a burden on the Corps to prove that
the lands at issue “significantly affect the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity” of navigable-in-fact waters.174 In
contrast, the congressional “goals and purposes” that must be
considered in light of the “significant nexus” support broad
federal authority and seem to contradict any judicial
requirement beyond the Corps’ obligation to reasonably
construe the CWA.175 Therefore, Justice Kennedy’s test will
consider congressional intent once the Corps has cleared a
much higher hurdle than Congress intended.176 This procedure
is far from a thorough and deferential evaluation of
congressional intent.
The third issue the significant nexus test presents is
whether courts will erode the relevancy of congressional intent
given its limited role in many of the lower court cases since
Rapanos.177 To an extent, congressional intent has been
mentioned and then quickly disregarded in the cases since
Rapanos.178 As pointed out below, the lack of consideration for
173
“The required nexus must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and
purposes.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This statement
indicates that courts must first find the “significant nexus,” and then assess the nexus
according to Congress’ intent behind the CWA.
174
Id. at 2248.
175
Congress evinced its intent that CWA jurisdiction be “the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been
made or may be made for administrative purposes.” S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972)
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3822. This broad interpretation of
federal jurisdiction resulted from the failures of states to implement their own
programs. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1-2 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3675 (“[M]any states do not have approved standards. Officials are still working to
establish relationships between pollutants and water uses. Time schedules for
abatement are slipping away because of failure to enforce, lack of effluent controls, and
disputes over Federal-State standards.”).
176
Id.
177
See N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2007); Envtl.
Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 824 (N.D. Cal. 2007); United
States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *21-22 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 2, 2006).
178
See N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000 (briefly mentioning Justice
Kennedy’s requirement to assess congressional goals and purpose, but failing to
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congressional intent in these cases may be irrelevant because
lower courts using the ambiguous significant nexus test have
consistently supported Congress’ intent without explicit
discussion.179 The omission of such discussion, however, could
prove troublesome for congressional intent if future courts
disregard the test’s assessment of goals and purposes
completely and focus solely on the existence of a nexus.180 If
such cases arose, courts would be deciding the Corps’
jurisdiction solely based on a scientific judgment, which the
Corps is better equipped to make than a court.181 Therefore, the
significant nexus test has led lower courts to briefly discuss
congressional intent, but the brief nature of this discussion
may cause future courts to abandon any consideration of this
intent.
C.

The Ambiguity of the Significant Nexus Test

A profound question surrounds the significant nexus
test: What really is a “significant nexus?” Lower courts are now

mention the CWA’s goals and purposes again); Johnson, 467 F.3d at 59 (discussing
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test and omitting any mention of assessing the
goals and purposes of the Clean Water Act); Fabian, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15 (same);
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s test
without referring to his assessment of congressional intent); Evans, 2006 WL 2221629,
at *21-22.
179
N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999-1000 (upholding the Corps’
jurisdiction despite limited discussion of congressional intent); Fabian, 2007 WL
1035078, at *15 (holding the wetlands at issue subject to the CWA despite brief
discussion of congressional intent); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 824
(upholding CWA jurisdiction under Kennedy’s standard despite no mention of
congressional intent); Evans, 2006 WL 2221629 at *23 (same).
180
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 69-70 (1994).
Judges are overburdened generalists, not philosophers or social scientists.
Methods of interpretation that would be good for experts are not suitable for
generalists. Generalists should be modest and simple. While recognizing that
specialists might produce a more nuanced approach, generalists must see the
process and error costs are much higher when they try to do the same thing.
Id. If future courts disregard congressional intent, these courts would ignore an
intended element of the significant nexus test, and reach their holdings based solely on
a scientific judgment. This would be troublesome because experts are better at making
scientific decisions than courts. Id.
181
The Corps is better equipped to make decisions concerning the existence of
a nexus because the Corps’ day-to-day activities involve making scientific judgments,
and because the Corps issues a manual defining which wetlands fall under its
jurisdiction. See discussion infra Part IV.D; see also Easterbrook, supra note 180, at 6970.
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asking this question, yet few reach a consistent definition.182
Justice Kennedy explains that, in terms of wetlands, they must
“significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity” of navigable-in-fact waters.183 Kennedy further allows
establishment of a nexus for adjacent wetlands when the Corps
can establish adjacency to navigable-in-fact waters.184 In the
case of adjacency to non-navigable waters, however, “[a]bsent
more specific regulations . . . the Corps must establish a
significant nexus on a case-by-case basis.”185 While the Ninth
Circuit found no trouble in holding that a man-made levee does
not bar a significant nexus between a wetland and a river,186 a
Texas District Court entirely dismissed the significant nexus
test.187 The district court complained that Justice Kennedy
failed to provide sufficient details to resolve the ambiguity of a
“significant nexus.”188 Thus, there is great potential for
disparate outcomes in the practical application of the
significant nexus test. In addition, the ambiguity of the
significant nexus test allows Justice Kennedy, its creator, to
command a majority of the Supreme Court on any conclusion
he reaches regarding the existence of a significant nexus.189
182
See N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 1000 (concluding that a pond held a
significant nexus despite minimal discussion of the significant nexus test); Johnson,
467 F.3d at 59 (discussing the ambiguous nature of the significant nexus test); United
States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (“Because
Justice Kennedy failed to elaborate on the ‘significant nexus’ required, this Court will
look to the prior reasoning in this circuit.”).
183
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Beyond the subject
of wetlands, the application of the significant nexus requirement to determine Corps
jurisdiction is likewise unclear, because Kennedy fails to explain whether or not his
test is an exception applicable only to wetlands. See id. at 2236-52.
184
Id. at 2249.
185
Id.
186
N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 1000. The facts in River Watch indicated
several hydrologic connections between the waters at issue and “waters of the United
States” despite the existence of the levee, so the Ninth Circuit had no trouble declaring
the existence of a “significant nexus.” Id. Even this court, however, did not define
“significant nexus.” See id.
187
Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
188
Id. The court also stated its disapproval for the “significant nexus” test. Id.
(“Justice Kennedy . . . advanced an ambiguous test—whether a ‘significant nexus’
exists to waters that are/were/might be navigable. This test leaves no guidance on how
to implement its vague, subjective centerpiece. That is, exactly what is ‘significant’ and
how is ‘nexus’ determined?”) (citations omitted). The court further stated, that
“[b]ecause Justice Kennedy failed to elaborate on the ‘significant nexus’ required, this
Court will look to the prior reasoning in this circuit.” Id.
189
This conclusion assumes that Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito
will continue to adhere to the plurality test and that Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Souter will continue to adhere to the agency deference approach. On this
issue, the Seventh Circuit commented, in most cases “any conclusion that Justice
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Thus, on the Supreme Court at least, the ambiguity of the
significant nexus test gives Justice Kennedy unitary power
over most cases involving federal authority over wetlands.190
Therefore, the ambiguity of the significant nexus test presents
a challenge to its practical application.
D.

The Necessity and Cost Implications of the Significant
Nexus Test

The significant nexus test suffers further by creating
the same standard as agency deference but with additional
procedural hurdles.191 To its credit, the test reaches the same
result as the plurality in Rapanos, while suggesting a more ecofriendly standard for evaluating the Corps’ jurisdiction.192 As
the plurality disapprovingly notes, however, “Justice Kennedy
tips a wink at the agency, inviting it to try its same expansive
reading again.”193 This “wink” means that, although the
significant nexus test may be different in form from an agency
deference approach, the practical results of employing the two
tests will almost always be the same.194 In fact, nearly all of the
lower courts applying the significant nexus test have

Kennedy reaches [with respect to] federal authority over wetlands will command the
support of five Justices.” United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725
(7th Cir. 2006).
190
The exception, as pointed out in Gerke, would occur in the case of a “slight
surface hydrological connection,” allowing the Rapanos plurality and dissenters to vote
to uphold federal jurisdiction, but the connection is too small for Justice Kennedy to
consider that a “significant nexus” exists. Id.
191
The test is essentially the same standard as agency deference because most
wetlands where the Corps’ jurisdiction would be reasonable also have a “significant
nexus” to traditionally navigable waters. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Though “significant nexus” is an ambiguous term, most lower courts since
Rapanos have upheld the Corps’ jurisdiction using this test. See N. Cal. River Watch,
496 F.3d at 1000; United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2006); United
States v. Fabian, No. 2:02-CV-495, 2007 WL 1035078, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2007);
United States v. Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *21-22 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 2, 2006). Justice Stevens further recognizes, “Justice Kennedy’s ‘significant
nexus’ test will probably not do much to diminish the number of wetlands covered by
the [CWA] in the long run.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While a more ecofriendly standard than the plurality test is hardly an accomplishment, the significant
nexus test does assess the goals and purposes of the CWA. See id. at 2248 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). These goals and purposes include seeking “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a).
193
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2235 n.15 (plurality opinion).
194
Id.
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eventually “deferred” to the Corps’ interpretation of the CWA.195
Two practicalities, however, are different beyond the similar
results in court holdings. First, the significant nexus test
imposes additional costs for property owners who must assess
their properties both in terms of the Corps’ regulations and
under a new judicial standard.196 Second, the significant nexus
test creates uncertainty for a property owner who either does
not understand the meaning of “significant nexus” or does not
know of the additional judicial definition.197
The costs of hiring wetlands experts, known as
hydrologists, to assess property will increase under the
significant nexus test.198 Usually, a developer will consult such
a hydrologist before filling a plot including potential wetlands
in order to determine whether the wetlands meet the Corps’
existing regulations for jurisdiction.199 In Rapanos, the property
owner asked a Michigan Department of Natural Resources
inspector to look over the site and discuss the feasibility of
195
See N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 1000; Johnson, 467 F.3d at 59; United
States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006); Fabian, 2007 WL
1035078, at *15; Evans, 2006 WL 2221629, at *21-22.
196
Property owners must pay for experts to assess their lands to determine
compliance with the Corps’ regulations, and then must pay for further assessments in
the event they choose to challenge the Corps’ jurisdiction to deny their permits.
197
A property owner wishing to challenge the Corps’ jurisdiction to deny a
permit cannot be expected to understand the judicially-constructed meaning for
“significant nexus.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198
If the significant nexus test becomes the standard for wetlands
jurisdiction, property owners will be forced to further employ wetlands experts to
evaluate the property for compliance with this additional test.
199
See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006). A wetlands manual provided by the Corps
further advises property owners of the following qualities that confer jurisdiction on
the Corps:

(1) prevalence of plant species typically adapted to saturated soil conditions,
determined in accordance with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s
National List of Plant Species that Occur in Wetlands;
(2) hydric soil, meaning soil that is saturated, flooded, or ponded for sufficient
time during the growing season to become anaerobic, or lacking in oxygen in
the upper part; and
(3) wetland hydrology, a term generally requiring continuous inundation or
saturation to the surface during at least five percent of the growing season in
most years.
Wetlands Research Program Technical Report, Y-87-1, 9-10 (Jan. 1987), available at
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/617377.html
[hereinafter
Technical
Report].
These
regulations provide precise, scientifically-determined definitions for the Corps’ exercise
of jurisdiction. Therefore, these regulations provide adequate limits on the Corps’
jurisdiction, supply definitions capable of a lay person’s understanding, and should not
be supplanted by a judicial construction like the significant nexus test. Rapanos, 126 S.
Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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building a shopping center.200 The government also used an
expert to testify at trial on the ecological functions of the
wetlands at issue.201 Hydrologists are a necessary and
indispensable part of any CWA case, but their work is not
cheap.202 Instead of assisting the developers with this burden,
however, the significant nexus test increases the burden by
imposing additional work on the hydrologists.203 If, indeed, the
significant nexus test is more than “a wink to the agency,” the
hydrologist must first assess whether the property contains the
applicable plant species, the soil, and inundation or saturation
of water.204 The hydrologist must then assess whether the
property significantly affects the chemical, physical, or
biological integrity of navigable-in-fact waters.205 If this test is
meant to reduce the burdens of overreaching jurisdiction by the
federal government, it does so by burdening the individual
property owner with higher costs of both wetlands experts and
attorneys fees to make the necessary determinations.206 If,
instead, the standard is meant to provide executive agencies
with a workable definition of what they can regulate, the test
again fails by imposing greater costs on the agencies to make
these same determinations.207 As Justice Stevens points out,
these costs are exactly what Riverside Bayview attempted to
avoid.208 Therefore, the dual standard of the significant nexus
200

Id. at 2253.
Id.
202
The cost of hiring a hydrologist is comparable to the cost of hiring any
other expert. For example, the Anoka Conservation District, a Minnesota nonregulatory state government subdivision, provides “water monitoring services”
to private landowners at costs ranging from $800 to $2700. Anoka Conservation
District’s Services Guide for 2007: Routine Water Monitoring Services,
http://www.anokaswcd.org/info/2007_fee_schedule.pdf.
203
Experts must additionally assess land to determine compliance with the
significant nexus test, whereas they would otherwise assess wetlands based only on the
standards in the Corps’ manual. See Technical Report, supra note 199.
204
Id.
205
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
206
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice
Kennedy’s approach will have the effect of creating additional work for all concerned
parties.”); see also Easterbrook, supra note 180.
207
Agencies, such as the Corps, will have the same additional costs as
property owners of hiring attorneys and wetlands experts to assess the additional
implications of the significant nexus test’s requirements. For the Corps, this burden
will be especially significant given its currently extensive involvement in several highprofile projects. See discussion infra note 213.
208
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“And the Corps will
have to make case-by-case . . . jurisdictional determinations, which will inevitably
increase the time and resources spent processing permit applications. These problems
are precisely the ones that Riverside Bayview’s deferential approach avoided.”).
201
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test creates unnecessarily high costs for private property
owners and the federal government that could be lowered by
adhering to agency deference.209
The significant nexus test also adds greater uncertainty
to the permit process for both property owners and the Corps.
The Corps’ definitions manual is extensive but not legal.210 This
allows a curious property owner to decipher its language as he
chooses. In contrast, the significant nexus test proposes a legal
standard for evaluating federal jurisdiction over wetlands,
which would prevent or at least make it difficult for a
layperson to discover on his own whether his property includes
wetlands.211 In addition, this test adds to both sides the
uncertainty of increased litigation.212 If the significant nexus
test is, in substance, the same as agency deference, why
provide property owners an added incentive to take these
matters to court under an illusory hope the Corps will be
unable to prove a “significant nexus?” From the Corps’
perspective, the significant nexus test burdens a government
agency, which is already overburdened in other areas, with
increased litigation.213 Thus, the additional costs and
209
The significant nexus test creates both additional litigation and expert fees
that would not be incurred with the agency deference approach. See discussion infra
Part V.B. In addition, there are further process and error costs associated with
increased judicial determinations. See Easterbrook, supra note 180.
210
The Corps issues this manual to provide guidance to property owners on
the terms of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3. See Technical Report supra note 199.
211
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Developers wishing
to fill wetlands adjacent to ephemeral or intermittent tributaries of traditionally
navigable waters will have no certain way of knowing whether they need to get § 404
permits or not.”).
212
With agency deference, the outcome would be more certain because the
Corps’ jurisdiction would be upheld, so long as its construction of the CWA was
reasonable. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
213
The Corps has recently taken significant stakes in the rebuilding efforts
within Iraq and Afghanistan, and the clean-up after Hurricane Katrina. While the
cost of litigation is unlikely to make a difference in these areas, the costs incurred
by litigation could always be used to assist with other projects in the absence of
the litigation. See generally Press Release, Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces
Press Service, U.S. General: Afghan Road, Electricity Projects Move Ahead, Oct. 18,
2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=1676 (discussing the
Corps’ $170 million investment in construction of infrastructure within Afghanistan);
Press Release, Norris Jones, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., Baghdad Counts on Local
Improvements, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/releases/NR06-1204.html (discussing 150 projects worth $500 million in Iraq for which the Corps
provides oversight); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press
Briefing on Gulf Coast Rebuilding, Aug. 22, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/08/20060822-5.html (officials from the Office of Gulf Coast Rebuilding,
FEMA, and the Corps discussing the rebuilding costs for parts of Louisiana and
Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina).
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uncertainty associated with the significant nexus test suggest
courts should rethink using this test.
E.

Post-Rapanos Judicial Treatment of the Significant
Nexus Test

The significant nexus standard will control future cases
unless a new standard is enunciated. As Justice Kennedy will
submit the fifth and deciding vote on most Supreme Court
cases involving wetlands jurisdiction, the only wetlands over
which this justice will not provide the controlling rule of law
will be: (1) all continuous, yet slight, surface connections to
navigable waters214 and (2) Justice Kennedy’s own property.215
As Justice Stevens notes, and as subsequent lower courts’
opinions have shown, the practical results to the environment
and the litigants of the significant nexus test are negligible in
comparison with an agency deference approach.216 The costs
and uncertainty that follow as a necessary result of the test’s
ambiguity, however, create powerful arguments against the
test’s merit.217 Therefore, the significant nexus test may be the
present standard for federal wetlands authority, but the
additional costs and uncertainty this test creates suggest
agency deference could more efficiently accomplish the same
results.
V.

THE AGENCY DEFERENCE APPROACH

Agency deference is the most appropriate standard for
CWA jurisdiction. In Chevron, the Supreme Court recognized
that cases concerning administrative agencies establish
principles of law in areas where judges are not typically
experts.218 Thus, courts must defer to the agency’s construction
of a statute when that construction is reasonable.219 This
214

United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006).
One would hope Justice Kennedy would choose to recuse himself if such a
matter arose.
216
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice Kennedy’s
‘significant nexus’ test will probably not do much to diminish the number of wetlands
covered by the Act in the long run.”).
217
See discussion supra Part IV.D.
218
See Rapanos v. United States, 376 F.3d 629, 640 (6th Cir. 2004).
219
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
The Court instructed:
215

First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
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interpretation of agency jurisprudence was not present when
the CWA was passed in 1972.220 The Riverside Bayview and
SWANCC decisions, however, each recognize the importance of
this mechanism.221 Moreover, deference makes economic sense,
saving time and money that would be unnecessarily wasted on
a judicial inquiry into a matter best reserved to experts in the
particular field.222 Although skeptics argue that deference gives
too much authority to agencies and opens the door to the
possibility of overreaching, several checks, including judicial
intervention when an agency’s interpretation is unreasonable,
prevent these fears from reaching fruition.223 Therefore, agency
deference should be applied to the exclusion of the plurality
and significant nexus tests in cases concerning federal
authority over wetlands.
A.

The History of the Agency Deference Approach

Since the inception of administrative agencies in the
late nineteenth century, courts have deferred to agencies’
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
220
Chevron was decided in 1984. Id.
221
The Riverside Bayview Court reached its holding based on agency
deference. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
The SWANCC Court recognized that agency deference would normally be the standard
of review for the Corps’ jurisdiction, if not for the “heightened concern” resulting from
the “constitutional questions” in that case. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001).
222
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the
[CWA] itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to
regulable waters, the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship
between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a
legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the
[CWA].
United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 729 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Easterbrook, supra
note 180. The judicial inquiry would be unnecessarily wasted because the same
result—upholding the Corps’ jurisdiction—could be reached simply by deferring to the
Corps’ jurisdiction. Under the agency deference approach, property owners could also
avoid uncertainty over whether the CWA gave the Corps’ jurisdiction over their land.
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a more detailed discussion,
see infra Part V.B.
223
Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 729.
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constructions of their statutory authority.224 In Chevron, the
Supreme Court noted the weight of these holdings, especially
when the regulatory interpretation at issue was considered
ambiguous.225 The Chevron Court then applied this precedent to
formulate a test: when a statute is “silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”226 Courts that follow this position
recognize that judges are ill-equipped to issue policy-related
statutory definitions and to trust the elaborate system of
checks and balances that govern executive agencies.227 This is
the case because the federal government’s executive branch is
directly accountable to the public, while the agency is not.228
Since Chevron, courts have widely followed the Supreme
Court’s approach to agency interpretations of federal statutes

224

Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331 (1896). The Webster Court, for example,

stated,
The practical construction given to an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of
different constructions, by one of the Executive Departments of the
government, is always entitled to the highest respect, and in doubtful cases
should be followed by the courts, especially when important interests have
grown up under the practice adopted.
Id. at 342. The Supreme Court also noted the deference owed to administrative
agencies in several other decisions before Chevron. See FEC v. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981) (“The interpretation put on the statute by
the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference.”); NLRB v. Brown,
380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965) (“Of course due deference is to be rendered to agency
determinations of fact, so long as there is substantial evidence to be found in the record
as a whole.”); Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16 (1932) (“The familiar
principle is invoked that great weight is attached to the construction consistently given
to a statute by the executive department charged with its administration.”).
225
Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 843. On this issue, the Chevron Court
remarked, “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent.” Id. at 843 n.9.
226
Id. at 843.
227
Verchick, supra note 65, at 861 (suggesting that agencies interpreting law
for a national program should favor their own views “over that of a single district or
appellate court”).
228
“Presidential control also leads to better political accountability.” Verchick,
supra note 65, at 857. Additionally,
Any president is likely to seek assurance that an unwieldy federal
bureaucracy conforms its actions to his or her basic principles. Any president
is likely to be concerned about excessive public and private costs. And any
president is likely to want to be able to coordinate agency activity so as to
ensure consistency and coherence . . . .
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 16 (1995), quoted in Verchick, supra note 65, at 855.
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and have referred to agency deference as Chevron deference.229
Thus, an agency’s constructions of the CWA still need only be
“rational” to be permissible.230
Since the adoption of the CWA, several Supreme Court
justices have employed agency deference to reach their
holdings. Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural
Resources Defense Council provides one of the first postChevron examples of agency deference used in connection with
the CWA.231 Upholding the EPA’s jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court held that an agency’s construction of the CWA need not
be the most permissible, but rather sufficiently rational to
prevent a court from substituting its judgment for that of the
agency.232
Next, Riverside Bayview became the first Supreme
Court case to use agency deference to address the Corps’
authority over wetlands.233 Courts have described the CWA as
“very complex.”234 These same courts, however, recognized that
agencies held broad jurisdiction under the CWA.235 Again
upholding an agency’s jurisdiction, the Riverside Bayview
Court held that the Corps’ definition of navigable waters was
reasonable as applied to adjacent wetlands.236 In the process,
229
Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. County Comm’rs of Carroll County, Md., 268 F.3d
255, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying agency deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the
CWA); Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 729-30 (deferring to the Corps’ construction of “water”
within the CWA); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (holding that
the EPA’s understanding of the CWA is entitled to “considerable deference”); Train v.
NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 75, 87 (1975) (deferring to the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean
Air Act).
230
Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 267; Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 729; Chem.
Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125.
231
Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125. In this case, an EPA practice of issuing
fundamentally different factor variances, a practice on which congressional intent had
been silent, was challenged as exceeding the limits of its jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act. Id. at 124.
232
Id. at 125.

This view of the agency charged with administering the statute is entitled to
considerable deference . . . to sustain it, we need not find that it is the only
permissible construction that EPA might have adopted but only that EPA’s
understanding of this very “complex statute” is a sufficiently rational one to
preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of EPA.
Id.
233

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 267; Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 729; Chem.
Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125.
235
Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 267; Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 729; Chem.
Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125.
236
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 139.
234
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the Court recognized that its review was “limited” by Chevron,
especially when express congressional intent counseled
deference to the Corps.237 The Riverside Bayview Court’s use of
agency deference also indicates that such deference is
necessary to preserve the Corps’ authority to interpret the
CWA, as this approach is the only position advocated in
Rapanos that allows courts to assess legislative history.238
Subsequently, several lower courts deferred to the Corps’
wetlands jurisdiction under the CWA.239 Therefore, the history
of agency deference indicates that this approach was the
standard for assessing wetlands jurisdiction before Rapanos.
B.

The Cost Implications of the Agency Deference Approach

The Corps’ wetlands manual provides the most efficient
method for determining CWA coverage in most cases. 240 This
manual includes a test—focusing on the present plant species,
the qualities of the soil, and the specific water connections
involved with the lands at issue—that provides a reasonable
method for determining which lands are covered without
additional litigation costs.241 Moreover, this test is
understandable to a layperson and therefore promotes both
efficiency and resource allocation.242 One may argue that a
237
Id. at 131 (“An agency’s construction of a statute it is charged with
enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the
expressed intent of Congress. Accordingly, our review is limited to the question
whether it is reasonable, in light of the language, policies, and legislative history of the
[CWA] for the Corps to exercise jurisdiction . . . .”).
238
Id. at 131-32. This Court recognized that an agency may look to underlying
policies of its statutory grant and legislative history in arriving at a reasonable
construction of its jurisdiction. Therefore, legislative history can be used to assess an
agency’s jurisdiction under the agency deference approach, but not under either the
plurality or significant nexus tests. Because the congressional acquiescence to the
broader definition of the Corps’ jurisdiction provides unique evidence of express
congressional intent, the agency deference approach becomes a necessity to preserving
the Corps’ intended jurisdiction. Id. at 132.
239
United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir. 2003) (using agency
deference to uphold the Corps CWA jurisdiction); Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 425 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (employing the
Riverside Bayview Court’s test of an “adequate basis” for the Corps’ legislative
construction).
240
See Technical Report, supra note 199.
241
Id.
242
By using terms such as “prevalence of plant species,” “saturated soil,” and
“wetland hydrology,” as opposed to “significant nexus,” the Corps’ wetlands manual
provides a definition of its jurisdiction to property owners in terms that can be
understood by a layperson. In contrast, the term “significant nexus” is a judiciallycrafted term, which no court has precisely defined. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Since the property owner is better informed under agency

378

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1

property owner who wishes to determine the CWA’s
applicability to his land faces the fees from consulting wetlands
experts and attorneys, regardless of which test a court may
apply.243 The Corps’ manual, however, provides property owners
with a definite idea of wetlands for which the Corps can
regulate development, thereby reducing the risk that a
property owner will make an uninformed decision to expend
time and money.244 If courts adopt an additional judicial test,
the Corps’ manual will lose this function, and property owners
will have to pay for additional wetlands assessments and
attorneys costs out of the resulting uncertainty from the
additional test.245 Therefore, the agency deference approach is
the most preferable standard from an economic perspective
because it minimizes property owners’ costs and provides them
with certainty over which wetlands are regulated.
C.

The Existence of Adequate Checks and Balances

In addition to the Corps’ existing test within the
wetlands manual, there are other checks on the Corps’
authority. First, one might question whether the Corps
jurisdiction is even a controversial issue, as the Corps approves
more than 99% of approximately 85,000 permits submitted.246

deference, logical extension suggests the property owner will allocate his resources in a
more efficient manner under this approach than under an additional judicial test,
where additional factors create uncertainty about the wetlands manual’s definition of
the Corps’ jurisdiction.
243
The argument would be that a property owner must still consult wetlands
experts and attorneys regardless of which test the court applies for the Corps’
jurisdiction.
244
Technical Report, supra note 199. By focusing on the present plant species,
the qualities of the soil, and the specific water connections involved with the lands at
issue, the wetlands manual uses terms that property owners can understand, thereby
giving them a definite idea of which wetlands are regulated. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at
2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245
See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In order to
learn whether his property had a “significant nexus” to navigable-in-fact waters, a
property owner would have to retain an attorney, incurring significant costs. See WalMart Watch—Battle-Mart: Hiring an Expert, http://walmartwatch.com/battlemart/
go/cat/expert__testimony__whistleblower (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) (“Land use
attorneys can cost more than $275 per hour.”). In addition, a property owner would also
need to retain a wetlands expert, also known as a hydrologist, to evaluate the property
and to determine the existence of a significant nexus. Id.; see also discussion supra note
203.
246
See ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 27, at 7. The Corps authorizes about
90% of these permits under a general permit where the Corps estimates the proposed
activity to have a minor impact. About 9% of these permits undergo a more detailed
evaluation, but the Corps usually denies only about 0.3% of total permits. Property
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Moreover, the EPA holds a veto power over every proposed
Corps permit, enabling the Agency to block any decision that
may result in jurisdictional overreach.247 Some commentators
claim the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and other agencies
also hold unofficial veto powers over the Corps’ decisions and
exercise them through threats of delay.248 Structurally,
executive agencies are accountable to the executive branch,
which is accountable to the political system.249 Finally,
executive agencies also hold a duty of loyalty to Congress,
which creates laws and delegates authority to agencies.250 If
judicial tests and statutory constructions interfere with this
delicate system of checks and balances, courts may frustrate
the original goals of the CWA and its broad federal authority to
ensure comprehensive environmental legislation.251 Further,
existing restrictions placed on executive agencies by the
political system, the executive, and fellow environmental
agencies already provide oversight for the Corps’ jurisdiction.252
Therefore, adequate checks and balances suggest that courts
should adopt the agency deference approach with respect to
federal authority over wetlands.

owners typically withdraw approximately 5% of applications prior to permit decisions.
Id.
247
See id. at 7. The EPA, the only federal agency with a veto power over the
Corps’ permitting decisions, has used its veto power 11 times over the CWA’s thirtyyear history. Id.
248
See id. The Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton Administrations
attempted to reduce these unofficial veto powers in order to expedite the Section 404
program, but some critics claim these attempts did not completely fix the problems. Id.
249
Verchick, supra note 65, at 857; see also Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2347 (2001) (discussing the intricacies of
agency’s relationships with Congress, the President, and the judicial branch). In
addition, Congress in 1996 passed the Congressional Review Act (CRA), requiring
agencies promulgating most new rules to submit a report and a copy of the rule to each
House of Congress. Both houses then have the authority to disapprove a rule, even if
the rule has already gone into effect. For a detailed discussion of the CRA and its
legislative history, see generally Morton Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to
Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemaking?: A Brief Overview, Assessment,
and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1051 (1999).
250
See supra note 249.
251
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). The statute states that the purposes of the CWA
are “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.” Id. These goals would be frustrated by additional judicial tests, which
impede on the Corps’ authority to restore and maintain these waters. Rapanos, 126 S.
Ct. at 2264 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252
See Verchick, supra note 65, at 857; ZINN & COPELAND I, supra note 27,
at 7.
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Environmental Effects of the Agency Deference Approach

Agency deference is also a superior standard from an
environmental policy perspective. This approach’s greatest
benefit to the environment is that it places most decisions
regarding environmental policy in the hands of the agency best
qualified to make the decisions.253 Thus, when a court assesses
an environmental agency’s interpretation of its governing
statute, the agency deference approach commands courts to
defer to the decision of the Corps, the EPA or the FWS, so long
as the decision is reasonable.254 In general, executive agencies
receive this deference because they benefit from scientific
expertise with respect to practical functions, like reducing
discharges of pollutants and preventing groundwater
contamination.255 The Corps has technical experience and
access to resources that no other agency or body of government
possesses, allowing it to make informed decisions about
environmental issues.256 In contrast, the Supreme Court rarely
hears cases involving environmental law or the Corps’
jurisdiction.257 Thus, the Corps, not courts, should be the
primary decision-makers on issues of environmental policy,
such as those issues involved with the Section 404 program.258
When the Corps’ jurisdiction is left as broad as possible under
the agency deference approach, fewer wetlands are
253
By deferring to the agency’s construction of a statute when its construction
is reasonable, courts allow agencies to make decisions based on their scientific
expertise. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984); see also
Easterbrook, supra note 180, at 69-70 (discussing the inappropriateness of judges
deciding matters of scientific judgment).
254
See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n. v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985); United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243; Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 75, 87 (1975); Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. County
Comm’rs of Carroll County, MD, 268 F.3d 255, 267 (4th Cir. 2001).
255
Verchick, supra note 65, at 862-63.

The scientific expertise within the EPA and the Army Corps justifies, in part,
Congress’ [sic] decision to delegate administrative powers to those agencies.
The courts have also acknowledged the specialized expertise of many
agencies and have cited such expertise as a basis for deferring to
administrative judgments when cases are close.
Id.
256

Id.
Rapanos was the only case on the Court’s 2006 docket involving
environmental law or the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2208.
Further, the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction has only arisen before the Supreme Court
three times in the CWA’s thirty-year history. See id. See generally SWANCC, 531 U.S.
159 (2001); Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121.
258
United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 729 (3d Cir. 1993).
257
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categorically excluded from the Corps’ jurisdiction, and the
Corps considers more permits on a case-by-case basis.259
Considering that most scientifically qualified agencies on
environmental issues make most of the jurisdictional decisions
under the agency deference approach, this approach is the
superior standard for courts to review the Corps’ wetlands
jurisdiction from an environmental policy perspective.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The logic behind a proper approach to judicial
assessment of the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction is not as
complicated as the sharp divisions within the Rapanos Court
seem to indicate. The plurality test presents an implausible,
inconsistent, and revisionist reading of the CWA’s history. This
test categorically excludes classes of wetlands and likely will
not gain widespread approval from lower courts.260 The
significant nexus test is an intermediate standard that most
courts now apply, but the ambiguous mechanics of this test
create uncertainty and fail to ultimately constrain the Corps’
jurisdiction.261 In contrast, the agency deference approach is a
standard that has worked for thirty years, reduces uncertainty,
leaves adequate checks and balances in place, and allows more
environmental decisions to be made by the most scientifically
qualified body.262 The Corps in Rapanos reasonably construed
the CWA; therefore, the Court should have deferred to its
construction and upheld jurisdiction. Likewise, future courts
should return to evaluating the Corps’ wetlands jurisdiction
under the agency deference approach without employing
additional judicial tests.
Brandon C. Smith†

259
This assertion is supported by the logical extension that the agency
deference approach would not categorically exclude wetlands failing to possess a
“significant nexus,” a “continuous surface connection” to “waters of the United States,”
or “relatively permanent, standing, or flowing bodies of water.” Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at
2221, 2224, 2248.
260
See discussion supra Part III.
261
See discussion supra Part IV.
262
See discussion supra Part V.
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